The United States began diplomatic relations with Kuwait in 1961, after its total independence from the United Kingdom. The United States shares a long history of friendship and cooperation with Kuwait, rooted in shared values, democratic traditions and institutions. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The U.S. armed forces and a multinational coalition drove Iraq out in 1991. The United States supports Kuwait`s sovereignty, security and independence, as well as its multilateral diplomatic efforts for closer cooperation between the GCC countries. Since 2003, Kuwait has been the main platform for U.S. and coalition operations in Iraq. Kuwait played a key role in facilitating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and related equipment, which ended in 2011. Kuwait is an important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, provides military, diplomatic and intelligence assistance, and also supports efforts to block the financing of terrorist groups.
Historically, states have attempted to report security to partners of their partners. In 1997, Romania declared that it would “increase its chances of quickly joining NATO by developing a new partnership with Hungary”, with a clear anticipation that Hungary`s Willingness to sign an agreement would reassure Hungary`s partners – NATO member countries – of Romania`s intentions. Footnote 93 The Estonian Minister of Defence similarly described a DCA with Turkey as a way to “show good relations with all members of the NATO alliance” in the hope that Turkey`s agreement would lead to the agreement of the Turkish partners. Footnote 94 And in 1998, Ukraine signed a major DCA with Argentina to assure Argentina`s defence partners, especially the United States, Ukraine`s interest in cooperating with the West. Footnote 95 Strategic cooperation between the United States and Kuwait was strengthened in 1987 by the establishment of a maritime protection regime guaranteeing freedom of navigation across the Persian Gulf for 11 Kuwaiti tankers that were labelled in the United States. Figure 4. Defence Cooperation Network in Asia, 2001-2010 A controversial example of negotiations between Singapore and Indonesia in 2007 provides an illuminating example. In response to Singapore`s request to access Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA contained an apparently benevolent implementation agreement that referred to an “Area Bravo” southwest of the Indonesian islands natuna. Footnote 48 Almost immediately after the signing of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of dishonesty and began speculating on the “wide margin” that the Singaporean army would exercise in the Bravo region.
which includes naval exercises, air support, live fires and even the participation of third parties, which, given Singapore`s growing military might, would likely strengthen over time. Footnote 49 The Indonesian Defence Minister, who echoes the ambiguities of the agreement, said that “Singapore still wants its own rules without having to negotiate… about their military training here. Footnote 50 He added: “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and extent of military training in Singapore, including the number of opportunities for the number of times Singapore can launch its missiles on our territory.” Footnote 51 While Singapore`s true preferences remain opaque, the Indonesian government`s mere perception of dual language was enough to derail the procedure.